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Abstract 
What features are important for democracy from a citizens’ perspective? How do citizens’ views of what 
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France, Germany, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. We find, first, that output-legitimacy is the most 
important driver for citizens’ choice of a governance arrangement. Second, we find that the importance citizens 
attribute to different dimensions of these governance bodies is a function of their more general views of 
democracy. Yet, third, the output-dimension is the most important driver for citizens’ choice of a governance 
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Introduction 
What do citizens expect from democratic governance? Under which circumstances do 
citizens evaluate a political system in a favorable way? Political scientists have been studying 
these questions for decades (Easton 1965, Norris 1999). A prominent distinction made in 
these debates is the one between the input- and the output-legitimacy of a political system 
(Scharpf 1999). One demand to the political system can be to provide opportunities for 
influencing decision-making and outcomes through political participation. A second demand 
to the political system can be to “effectively promote the common welfare of the constituency 
in question” (Scharpf 1999, 6). While meaningful input to and good output from a political 
system can perfectly go together and jointly enhance the system’s legitimacy, they sometimes 
can be at odds with each other: When citizens have many options to participate in politics and 
influence decision-making processes, this might render the efficient production of output 
difficult because finding consensus gets more demanding. In a similar vein, “the democratic 
process may impair important substantive rights or other requirements of justice” (Bühlmann 
and Kriesi 2013, 45). 
How do citizens view such trade-offs? And what do they value about democracy? In 2012, 
the renowned European Social Survey included a series of questions with the aim to assess 
citizens’ conceptions of democracy (European Social Survey 2012). The stated aim was to 
capture “the variety of conceptions of democracy that exist among Europeans” (Ferrín and 
Kriesi 2016, 2) to assess what dimensions of democratic politics citizens deem important and 
which aspects of democracy cluster together when one takes on a citizen’s perspective. Their 
results reveal that most Europeans share a minimal definition of democracy but also that they 
differ substantively in their views about the additional functions a democracy should fulfill 
(Kriesi et al. 2016). 
While this study represents a great leap forward in research on citizens’ views and 
evaluations of democracy, it leaves important questions unaddressed.1 Most importantly, we 
do know little about whether and how these more abstract views translate into evaluations of 
specific political institutions: What dimensions of democratic legitimacy do citizens rely on 
when they are asked to evaluate specific governance arrangements2? Are they guided by their 
                                                            
1 In this paper, we follow Ferrín and Kriesi (2016) in the use of the terminology. “Views of democracy” denote 
citizens’ norms orientations on a more abstract level: What features are generally important for any democracy? 
“Evaluations of democracy” on the other hand denote citizens’ assessment of real-existing democracies or 
specific political institutions. 
2 With the term “specific governance arrangements” we refer to decision-making bodies or institutions that are 
vested with a certain amount of political power. Those can be traditional political institutions such as parliaments 
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views on democracy in their evaluation of specific political objects? Or are some dimensions 
of these governance arrangements deemed more important irrespective of the views that 
citizens hold on a more abstract level?  
We address these questions by analyzing citizens’ evaluations of a specific subnational 
governance arrangement. We draw on unique data from a cross-national online-survey 
experiment which was conducted in eight metropolitan areas in Switzerland, Germany, France 
and the UK. In this conjoint experiment, citizens were asked to evaluate governance 
arrangements that have the task to design and implement a major public transport project in 
the respondents’ metropolitan area. These governance arrangements varied with respect to the 
nature of their input-, throughput-, and output-legitimacy – dimensions deemed important for 
democratic legitimacy (Scharpf 1999, Schmidt 2013) – as well as with respect to their formal 
authority (Hooghe and Marks 2015). The use of conjoint analysis allows for assessing multi-
dimensional choices and to assess the “causal effects of various components of a treatment in 
survey experiments” (Hainmueller et al. 2014, 2). More importantly, however, it allows us to 
analyze which dimensions of these governance arrangements are deemed more or less 
important – when not all of them can be maximized simultaneously. 
The results suggest, first, that citizens are mostly concerned with output-legitimacy and to 
a lesser extent with throughput-legitimacy in metropolitan governance arrangements. 
Furthermore, ex-post approval of supra-local decision-making by local governments is 
deemed important as well. Second, citizens’ views of democracy seem to guide their 
evaluation of governance arrangements when it comes to the importance of the input- and the 
throughput-dimension. However, the output-dimension is deemed the most important one 
irrespective of the democratic views citizens hold. 
 
   
                                                                                                                                                                                         
or executives; or more network-based decision-making bodies that are only loosely coupled to representative 
bodies and include non-elected actors. To use the terminology of Hooghe and Marks (2003), we refer to both 
type-I and type-II governance bodies. 
3 
 
Theoretical Argument 
Procedure vs. Substance: What Type of Legitimacy Do Citizens Prefer? 
Is democracy about “procedures” or about “substance”? How do political systems obtain 
their legitimacy? Through procedures that live up to democratic standards? Or rather by 
providing good outcomes? In political theory this is a debated issue (for an overview see 
Cohen 1997). Advocates of a substantive account in political theory put forward the idea that 
the normative value of democracy lies in the output it produces. Procedures alone are not 
sufficient to generate legitimacy and are mostly conceived as a means to an end (Arneson 
2003). In this line of thought, democracy needs to “promote the common welfare of the 
people” (Bühlmann and Kriesi 2013, 44) to be legitimate. Proceduralists, on the other hand, 
criticize that outcomes are always contested. Good procedures are seen as the only way of 
generating democratic legitimacy in an uncontested way (Dahl 1998). 
Empirical political scientists are equally interested in the question of what makes a 
political system legitimate in the eyes of its constituency (Easton 1965). Traditionally, 
political systems are conceived as having two possibilities to enhance their legitimacy in the 
eyes of citizens: through allowing for democratic input to the system and through providing 
good output from the system. Drawing on Scharpf (1999: 6 ff.), we can define input-oriented 
legitimizing views as emphasizing ‘government by the people’, i.e. that political choices are 
assessed against the extent to which they represent the authentic preferences of a community - 
the will of the people. Popular votes or direct election of representatives are examples of 
procedures that aim to ensure input-oriented legitimacy of political decisions. By contrast, 
output-oriented legitimizing views emphasize ‘government for the people’, i.e. that political 
choices are assessed against the extent to which they effectively promote the common welfare 
of a community – the well-being of the people. The effectiveness of policies in solving public 
problems, or the performance of state agencies in delivering public services are examples of 
sources for output-oriented legitimacy. More recently, scholars introduced a third way for a 
political system to obtain legitimacy, namely “throughput”. Throughput legitimacy concerns 
the quality of (internal) governing processes of the institutions and actors concerned with 
policy-making (Schmidt 2013). Throughput-legitimacy can, for instance, be enhanced by a 
transparent way of policy-making – i.e. through public negotiation and decision-making 
processes (Héritier 2003) or by a good quality of deliberation in decision-making bodies – i.e. 
discussions and decisions based on reasons and not on political power considerations only (cf. 
Papadopoulos and Warin 2007). In sum, “‘throughput’ legitimacy concentrates on what goes 
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on inside the ‘black box’” between the input to, and the output from a political system 
(Schmidt 2013). 
Which of these three principles is the most important for citizens’ positive evaluations of 
governance arrangements? For the evaluation of European Union governance, Fuchs (2011) 
finds that instrumental considerations (e.g. personal and national benefits) are the most 
important correlates. In contrast, Hooghe and Marks (2004) find an exclusive national identity 
to have a more negative effect on EU support than a favorable economic calculus having a 
positive one. In an analysis of 54 third-wave democracies, Chu et al. (2008) find that citizens’ 
support for the claim that democracy is the best form of government is not heavily affected by 
a bad evaluation of a regime’s economic performance. At the same time, Dalton (2004, 74-76) 
finds that citizens’ support for incumbents and for political institutions strongly depends on 
the assessment of their personal financial situation. Moving to the local level, Denters (2014) 
finds that functional and procedural considerations are equally important for explaining 
satisfaction with local democracy. On the other hand, Perry (2014) finds that satisfaction with 
the performance of local institutions is the most important driver of local attachment – an 
indicator for diffuse system support (Norris 1999). 
What do these findings mean for the evaluation of specific governance arrangements? The 
results from Dalton’s (2004) study suggest that for the evaluation of specific governance 
arrangements, factors related to the output of political systems are deemed more important 
than factors related to the input of political systems (see also Rothstein 2009, Dahlberg and 
Holmberg 2014 for similar arguments). This is in line with Scharpf’s (1999, 2) main claim in 
his seminal book Governing in Europe. He states that “the weakening of political legitimacy 
in Western Europe is a consequence of the loss of problem-solving capacities of political 
systems”. Furthermore, some scholars have suggested that there is an increasing emphasis on 
performance legitimacy for the evaluation of democratic regimes (Haus 2014). For our 
assessment of citizens’ evaluation of specific governance arrangements we accordingly posit 
that substance trumps procedure or, put differently, that output- is deemed more important 
than throughput- and input-legitimacy. Our first hypothesis reads as follows: 
H1: Output is a more important driver than input or throughput for citizens’ evaluation 
of specific governance arrangements (“Substance”-Hypothesis) 
How Do Citizens’ Views of Democracy Guide Their Evaluation of 
Governance Arrangements? 
Admittedly, this hypothesis is rather blunt. One can justifiably argue that not all citizens 
prefer output over throughput and input in their evaluation. More precisely, what citizens 
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deem important when evaluating specific governance arrangements might depend on their 
more abstract view of democracy. Democracy is a multilayered and complex, if not contested 
concept, both theoretically and empirically. Scholars identified a variety of both ideal typical 
and empirical models of democracy (Held 2006, Coppedge and Gerring 2011, Lijphart 2012). 
Some of these models put a stronger focus on citizen participation, while others value checks 
and balances. Some scholars advocate a minimalist definition of democracy, and others 
promote a very maximalist definition (Schumpeter 2010, Barber 1984). 
But what do ordinary citizens think about when they think about democracy? Different 
scholars have pointed out that citizens hold different views about what democracy should be 
(Fuchs 1999, Schedler and Sarsfield 2007). However, until recently, a comprehensive analysis 
of citizens’ views of democracy was missing. This changed with the aforementioned 
European Social Survey (2012). In this survey citizens were asked to assess the importance of 
sixteen different items capturing different dimensions of democracy. In How Europeans View 
and Evaluate Democracy, Ferrín and Kriesi (2016) – together with a team of researchers – 
analyze these assessments. They find that a minimal definition of liberal democracy – free and 
fair elections and equality before the law – is widely accepted across Europe (73.1% of 
respondents view these two elements as necessary conditions for democracy). Yet, they also 
find that beyond this minimal definition, citizens can be distinguished into different types of 
democrats. Some of them adhere to additional components of liberal democracy (such as 
having a free press, protecting minorities and independent courts) while others combine this 
minimal definition with democratic norms that are connected to a more substantive (i.e. social 
justice) or to a more direct-democratic vision of democracy (Kriesi et al. 2016). The social 
justice understanding is captured through support for income redistribution and protection 
against poverty, while the direct-democratic understanding is captured through support for 
referendums. A third of all respondents can be called “fully committed democrats” that adhere 
to all three models of democracy (Kriesi et al. 2016, 86) but the rest of them is eclectic and 
cherishes some democratic norms while neglecting others.3  
What does this mean for our question about citizens’ evaluations of specific governance 
arrangements? A straightforward assumption based on these findings is that citizens’ 
emphasize those features of specific governance arrangements in their evaluation which 
correspond to their more abstract views about what is important for democracy. Facing the 
                                                            
3 Whether someone is a liberal-, a direct- or a social justice-democrat depends on a number of factors. The most 
important of them is the status of an individual. High-status individuals (high-skilled and/or high income) 
endorse a liberal understanding of democracy to a bigger extent than low-status individuals, which tend to a 
social justice understanding of democracy. However, the effects of these individual-level factors vary across 
different institutional and historical contexts (Ceka and Magalhães 2016). 
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challenge to make a choice in a specific situation, individuals often rely on their fundamental 
value orientations. Citizens’ views about what is important for democracy can be conceived 
as value orientations that structure decision-making in a specific choice situation. Our second 
hypothesis accordingly reads as follows: 
H2: Citizens evaluate specific governance arrangements more favorably whose features 
are in line with their views on democracy. (“Democratic Models”-Hypothesis) 
The Prevalence of Output over Democratic Norms 
Under certain circumstances, Hypothesis 1 and 2 can be in conflict with each other. What 
should we citizens expect to do when a specific governance arrangement has a high output 
quality but goes against their views of democracy? Would they choose it over an arrangement 
that fulfills their democratic norm orientations but is suboptimal in terms of output quality? 
We argue here that this is the case and that output trumps other democratic views. In line with 
Scharpf’s (1999) claim we assume that a satisfactory output is the most important condition 
for the legitimacy of a political system. Procedural characteristics are second order – even if 
one holds them in high esteem on a more abstract level. To a certain extent, this idea can be 
connected to Maslow’s (1943) research on individual needs. He assumes that a hierarchy of 
needs exist and that higher ranked needs only become salient once lower ranked needs are 
satisfied. In our view, the output of a certain governance arrangement could be seen as a 
lower ranked need that has to be fulfilled to a satisfactory degree before any higher ranked 
need – in our case more procedural democratic norms – become salient. Indirect evidence for 
this idea comes from Ceka and Magalhães (2016, 110) who build on the models from Kriesi 
et al (2016) introduced above and analyze how socio-demographic characteristics are linked 
to preferences for one or another model of democracy. They find that “in most countries, an 
understanding of democracy that is intrinsically concerned with social justice [i.e. substance-
oriented] is clearly more espoused by lower status individuals than higher status ones.” For 
evaluations of specific governance arrangements, this implies that they have to fulfill some 
basic requirements in the form of satisfactory output – even if citizens’ cherish procedural 
views of democracy on a more abstract level. Our last hypothesis, thus, reads as follows: 
H3: When citizens have to choose between maximizing output and maximizing their 
views of democracy, they choose governance arrangements that maximize output 
(“Prevalence of Output”-Hypothesis) 
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Research Design 
To test the hypotheses formulated in the previous sections, we use a survey-based 
experimental design. Since we are interested in the features of governance arrangements that 
drive citizens’ evaluations, an experimental design is the best strategy. It allows for random 
variation of said features and for checking how these variations affect citizens’ evaluations of 
governance arrangements. A limitation of traditional experimental designs is that they only 
allow for assessing the effect of one treatment at a time. However, our endeavor is to analyze 
citizens’ reaction to different features that vary simultaneously. Put differently, the treatment 
consists of multiple components of which all are expected to have an impact. To analyze the 
effects of such multi-dimensional treatments, Hainmueller et al. (2014, 2) propose conjoint 
analysis “as a tool to identify the causal effects of various components of a treatment in 
survey experiments.” In our case, the features of a governance arrangement are the 
components, whose effects on citizens’ evaluations we want to assess and conjoint analysis is, 
thus, a well-suited experimental design for our endeavor. 
The Context: Metropolitan Governance Arrangements 
So far, we only spoke of “governance arrangements” in a very broad sense. This subsection 
discusses the context and the precise features of the governance arrangement assessed here. 
We focus our analysis on governance arrangements in metropolitan areas. Metropolitan areas 
are congregations of geographically and functionally linked and interconnected urban and 
suburban territories. In most cases, a number of suburban towns and villages cluster around 
one or more center cities.4 Metropolitan areas are not only the core sites of 21st century 
economic activity and capitalist competition (Brenner 2003), they are also the main habitat of 
the human species since 2010 (World Bank 2016). This metropolitanization of economic and 
social interactions also creates challenges for the governance of these areas. An increasing 
number of issues require solutions that transcend local boundaries and require the cooperation 
and coordination of local governments in these regions (Heinelt and Kübler 2005, Kübler and 
Pagano 2012). 
We center our analysis on the issue of public transportation. Public transportation is a 
paradigmatic case of a metropolitan problem that requires coordination between different 
political actors in metropolitan areas (Gerber and Gibson 2009, 635). The purpose of public 
                                                            
4 Statistical offices usually define metropolitan areas through commuting patterns between the cities, towns and 
villages in an area. When the amount of out- and in-commuters to and from other places in the area exceeds a 
certain threshold, a place is considered to be part of the area. However, the precise definitions of metropolitan 
areas vary across different countries. For having a comparable definition of metropolitan areas, we therefore rely 
on the definition of Eurostat’s (2014) “larger urban zones.” 
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transportation is to connect places to enable a quick movement of people from A to B. This 
increased connectivity in turn results in higher degrees of metropolitanization because it 
allows people to live in one place and work in another. It is, thus, pivotal for successful public 
transportation planning that the relevant actors cooperate across municipal boundaries. 
But why should we analyze citizens’ attitudes towards public transportation governance 
arrangements in metropolitan areas? What can this very specific case tell us about our general 
hypotheses? 
First of all, political attitudes towards metropolitan governance arrangements are an 
interesting object of study in themselves. Since the Second World War, there are debates 
about how to organize governance in metropolitan areas (Bromage 1958, Savitch and Vogel 
2009). Yet, so far we know very little about citizens’ perceptions of these different 
propositions. Only recently, scholars began to study citizens’ perceptions of the metropolitan 
level (Lidström 2013, Kübler 2016, Lackowska and Mikuła 2016). The questions asked in 
these studies are very varied, however, and a systematic, cross-national assessment of 
citizens’ evaluations of metropolitan governance arrangements is still missing.  
Our analysis is not only interesting for scholars of metropolitan governance, however. If 
we want to know whether citizens are guided by their views on democracy for their evaluation 
of specific governance arrangements, metropolitan governance arrangements are a least likely 
case to test this assumption (Gerring 2007). Citizens are usually not very familiar with 
metropolitan governance arrangements and their knowledge about metropolitan governance is 
limited (Swianiewicz and Lackowska 2007). While metropolitan areas are ideologically 
divided spaces – mostly between center cities and suburbs – these ideological divides are not 
about the way in which metropolitan areas should be governed (Sellers et al. 2013). 
Metropolitan governance is a largely de-politicized issue (Deas 2014) and citizens are thus not 
often confronted with it. For our study, this means that when citizens use their views on 
democracy for evaluating such governance arrangements even in a case which is quite remote 
from traditional political institutions, we can reasonably expect that they also do so when they 
are more familiar with a certain governance arrangement. While citizens are not familiar with 
metropolitan governance arrangements, they certainly are with the policy area of public 
transportation. The quality of public transportation affects the daily life of many metropolitan 
residents and they thus have a vital stake in how public transport governance works. 
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The Scenario: A Commission for an Underground Line Construction in 
the Metropolis 
The specific story we chose for assessing citizens’ evaluation of metropolitan governance 
arrangements can be found in table 1. In a first step, respondents were asked to imagine that a 
new underground train line was built in their region and that a commission was established to 
define, design and carry out this project. The term ‘commission’ was deliberately vague, to 
avoid respondents making any implicit references to existing agencies or authorities in their 
metropolitan area of residence.  
In a second step, respondents’ preferences for commissions that varied on five attributes 
(see below) were measured. More precisely, each respondent was presented with three choice 
tasks of opposing pairs of different commissions, in which she had to indicate the one of the 
two commissions she liked better. In addition, respondents were asked to rate each 
commission on a scale from 1-7 (see table 2 for an example). Each commission consisted of a 
random combination of attribute levels and the order of the five attributes was randomized 
across respondents but remained constant within respondents. This means that each 
respondent was presented with a different order of the attributes, but that this order remained 
constant over the three choice tasks.5 
While the choice and the rating of a commission represent the dependent variables, the five 
attributes constitute the independent variables in the conjoint analysis. Three of these 
attributes operationalize the different dimensions of democratic legitimacy and two of them 
operationalize the formal authority a commission holds. The first attribute refers to the 
composition of a commission and the aim is to vary its degree of input-legitimacy. More 
precisely, this attribute has three levels that were varied randomly across commissions shown 
to the respondents: decision-makers could either be directly elected by citizens, delegated by 
local authorities, or appointed independent technical experts. Elected members represent the 
most direct possibility for input by the citizens, and thus reflect the idea of a democratically 
elected metropolitan government in scholarly debates (Lefèvre 1998, Gerber and Gibson 
2009). Delegate members are only indirectly linked to the citizens. This composition reflects 
inter-municipal cooperation arrangements in many European countries (Hulst and Van 
Montfort 2007). Finally, an expert commission has no link to citizens and thus the least input 
legitimacy. 
The second attribute aims to capture throughput legitimacy. A central criterion for 
throughput legitimacy is the transparency of the negotiation- and the decision-making process 
                                                            
5 This can prevent “attribute order effects” – effects that occur only because of the position of an attribute.  
10 
 
(Héritier 2003). Only this allows citizens to evaluate the different arguments made and hold 
the respective actors accountable for their actions (Haus 2014). Therefore, we operationalize 
this dimension by two attribute levels that measure whether these decision-making processes 
were public or not. 
Finally, the third attribute captures the efficiency of a commission’s work and, thus, one 
dimension of output legitimacy. While one might argue that the effectiveness – the quality 
with which the project was implemented in the end – is more important, we decided to vary 
the commission’s efficiency. A variation in the success of the project would have been too 
dominant in influencing respondents’ choices.6 Accordingly, we varied the extent to which 
the budget was over-run by the commission: 0 to 10 percent, 10 to 20 percent, 20 to 30 
percent. 
While the main aim of the experiment is to assess the impact of the three legitimacy 
dimensions, we control for different degrees of a commission’s formal authority. When a 
commission’s formal authority varies, respondents could be expected to change the weight 
they give to different dimensions of democratic legitimacy.7 For the operationalization of 
formal authority, we relied on two indicators proposed by Hooghe and Marks (2015, 315) for 
measuring delegation and pooling of formal authority in international organizations. Both of 
these indicators belong to the “pooling”-dimension. This is the case because “[d]elegation is a 
grant of authority to a third party” (ibid.) Delegation, thus, refers to the tasks of an 
organization. This is already captured in our introductory story8 and is, thus, not part of the 
randomized treatment. Furthermore, we combined Hooghe and Marks (2015) “bindingness” 
and “ratification” of a decision into one single attribute which captures the veto power of local 
                                                            
6 Indeed, in our pretest we used a different formulation for the budget-attribute with only two attribute levels 
(“the budget is undershot or respected” vs. “the budget is overshot”). This produced very strong effects and we 
decided to attenuate the formulation a bit. If we find such strong effects for efficiency already (where it’s only 
about how something is implemented, and not if), we might expect much stronger effects for a variation in 
efficacy (something is implemented vs something is not implemented). The budget over-run attribute is thus a 
rather conservative operationalization of the output dimension. Furthermore, the operationalization through three 
different degrees of budget over-run is also more realistic with respect to real-world situations, since many big 
infrastructure projects consume more financial resources than initially budgeted. 
7 For instance, when a decision comes into force, without further agreement of local authorities, citizens’ might 
be more concerned about having an influence on determining the decision-makers than when there’s a veto 
power of local authorities. 
8 “Imagine that the public authorities in the [X] region have decided to build a new underground line to relieve 
traffic congestion. To do so, a commission is established to plan this new underground (routing, location of 
stops) and coordinate construction.” 
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governments. We have done so first to reduce the complexity of the experiment9 and second, 
to prevent non-logical combinations of attribute levels10. 
Table 1: Attributes and Attribute Levels for Conjoint Analysis 
 
[Introductory Text / Scenario] 
Over the next 20 years an increase in traffic is expected for the [X] region. The existing public 
transport network is reaching its limits. 
Imagine that the public authorities in the [X] region have decided to build a new underground line to 
relieve traffic congestion. To do so, a commission is established to plan this new underground (routing, 
location of stops) and coordinate construction. 
How do you think this commission should be set up? How should it function?
We will now present you three times with two possibilities. Please indicate each time, which of the two 
commissions you would prefer – regardless of whether you support a new underground line in the [X] 
region or not. 
 
[Attribute] [Attribute Levels]  
The members of the commission… 
[Input Legitimacy: Members] 
 
1) are directly elected by the citizens of the [X] 
region [Elected] 
2) represent the local authorities in the [X] region 
[Delegates] 
3) are independent experts [Experts] 
Relationship of the commission with the public 
[Throughput Legitimacy: Transparency] 
1) All documents and negotiations are public 
[Public] 
2) Only the final decisions will be made public, the 
negotiations are not open to the public 
[Not Public] 
Cost awareness of the commission 
[Output Legitimacy: Budget Over-Run] 
1) The project budget is exceeded by 0-10% 
[0-10%] 
2) The project budget is exceeded by 10-20% 
[10-20%] 
3) The project budget is exceeded by 20-30% 
[20-30%] 
The commission makes decisions… 
[Formal Authority: Decision Mode] 
1) by majority vote [Majority] 
2) unanimously [Unanimous] 
The commission’s decisions …  
[Formal Authority: Implementation] 
1) come into force without further agreement of 
the local authorities in the [X] region [No 
Approval] 
2) only come into force when approved by the 
local authorities in the [X] region [Approval] 
  
These five attributes and their two- to three attribute levels yield a total of 72 possible 
commissions (23*32=72) and 2556 possible combinations of commissions (72*71/2=2556). 
Each respondent was presented with three choice tasks, i.e. was asked to indicate the preferred 
commission in three pairwise comparisons. A total of 5052 respondents participated in our 
survey (see below) which means that – on average – each possible combination was evaluated 
                                                            
9 For example, the difference between a decision not being binding for the involved actors and it having to be 
ratified by them is a very subtle one that is difficult to grasp for respondents. 
10 It, for example, could be perceived as a contradiction for a decision to be binding for and to require ratification 
by local authorities at the same time. 
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almost 12 times (5052*6/2556=11.8) and each commission was on average evaluated 421 
times (5052*6/72=421). In contrast to other conjoint analysis, in which only a sample of 
possible combinations is assessed (Hainmueller et al. 2014), in our case each combination was 
assessed several times. This is a benefit and increases the validity of our results. 
Table 2: Example of Choice Task 
“Here we go. This is the first of three paired comparisons: 
 Commission A Commission B 
The members of the commission… Are directly elected by the 
citizens of the [X] region  
Represent the local 
authorities in the [X] region 
The commission makes 
decisions… 
Unanimously Unanimously 
The commission’s decisions …  
 
Only come into force when 
approved by the local 
authorities in the [X] region 
Come into force without 
further agreement of the 
local authorities in the [X] 
region  
Relationship of the commission 
with the public 
All documents and 
negotiations are public  
All documents and 
negotiations are public  
Cost awareness of the commission The project budget is 
exceeded by 20-30% 
The project budget is 
exceeded by 0-10% 
   
Which of these two commissions do you 
prefer? 
□A □B 
   
How would you rate Commission A on a scale from 1 to 7? 1 indicates that you "don't approve at all" 
and 7 indicates that you "strongly approve" the commission  
Don’t approve 
at all 
     Strongly 
approve
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
 
How would you rate Commission B on this scale?  
Don’t approve 
at all 
     Strongly 
approve 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
 
For our second hypothesis, we need an additional measure for citizens’ views of 
democracy. To assess these views, our questionnaire was inspired by the European Social 
Survey (2012) items but we departed from them in an important way. As one can see from 
figure 1, items in the European Social Survey where on average attributed an importance over 
8 on a scale from 0 to 10, which is a clearly left-skewed distribution. This means, that it is 
difficult to say what norm citizens prefer in case they have to choose, especially if everything 
is deemed important. We, therefore, asked citizens to assess two items at the same time that 
stated opposite claims of what is ‘important’ in a democracy (the items can be found in table 
A.1 in the appendix). In figure 1, the mean value of these 10 items is depicted. While the 
answers are still leaning more towards approval of the 10 items, this is less the case than for 
the one-sided items asked in the European Social Survey. These ten items, or five “democratic 
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trade-offs” respectively, allowed us to directly calculate which democratic norm citizens 
prefer over another one by subtracting the first statement from the second one. Histograms for 
these five democratic trade-offs can be found in the appendix in figure A.1.11 
Figure 1: Average importance of 16 ESS norms of democracy 
 
Note. Own Calculations. Data Source: European Social Survey (2012), Own Data. The survey question in the 
ESS was: How important do you think it is in a democracy that […]. Items could be rated on a scale from 0-10, 
where 0 means “not important at all” and 10 means “very important”. The survey question for the democratic 
trade-offs was: “Often democracy is a compromise. Please tell us what you think about the following 
statements:” Items could be rated on a scale from 0-10, where 0 means “not important at all” and 10 means 
“very important” 
The Data: An Online-Survey in Eight Metropolitan Areas 
The data for this study stem from an online-survey that was conducted in eight 
metropolitan areas in four countries. It was fielded in fall 2015 and includes a total of 5052 
interviews of representative samples of the resident population aged 18 to 75 in two French, 
two German, two Swiss and two British metropolitan areas. 
The distribution of respondents within metropolitan areas reflects the spatial distribution in 
the basic population of these areas (see table 3). The countries and the metropolitan areas 
were selected according to a most-different-case-design logic (Gerring 2007). Two of the 
countries are federal and their principal subnational tier have a high degree of regional 
authority, while the two other countries are unitary and their principal subnational tier have a 
rather low degree of regional authority (Hooghe et al. 2016). In each country the capital 
                                                            
11 It was quite frequent that citizens did not prefer one norm over the other, i.e. attributed the same importance to 
them. We take this middle category into account in our analysis (see below). 
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region and another major metropolitan area was chosen. Some of these areas have a 
government tier that encompasses the functional metropolitan area (i.e. a metropolitan 
government) and others don’t. Finally, the metropolitan areas differ quite substantively in 
their population size. If we find similar results across these different cases, this provides a 
strong basis for a generalization of the findings beyond the eight metropolitan areas and to 
other European countries. 
Respondents were recruited in different ways in the four countries. In Switzerland, a 
random sample of 2257 valid individual addresses of the resident population (aged 18 to 75) 
in the Bern and Zurich metropolitan areas was drawn by the Swiss Statistical Office. For the 
field phase we relied on the Swiss Survey Institute MIS Trend. Invitation letters to fill in an 
online questionnaire were sent to all these individuals, together with an unconditional 
incentive of 10 Swiss Francs (~10.12 US$).  
Table 3: Case Selection and Data 
Country State Structure 
RAI-
Score 
Metro. 
Area Capital 
Metro. 
Gov. 
Population 
(2012) 
Survey-Respondents 
Cent. Surr. Tot. 
CH Federal 26.5 
Bern Yes No 360,127 193 (35%) 
366 
(65%) 
559 
(100%) 
Zurich No No 1,217,751 188 (31%) 
419 
(69%) 
607 
(100%) 
DE Federal 24 
Berlin Yes No 4,951,687 494 (76%) 
158 
(24%) 
652 
(100%) 
Stuttgart No Yes 2,647,134 153 (25%) 
453 
(75%) 
606 
(100%) 
FR Unitary 10 
Lyon No Yes 1,934,717 194 (29%) 
473 
(71%) 
667 
(100%) 
Paris Yes No 11,800,687 119 (19%) 
522 
(81%) 
641 
(100%) 
UK Unitary 5 
London Yes Yes 12,208,100 226 (34%) 
440 
(66%) 
666 
(100%) 
Birming-
ham No No 2.873,800 
349 
(53%) 
305 
(47%) 
654 
(100%) 
      Total 1916 (38%) 
3136 
(62%) 
5052 
(100%) 
Note. RAI-Score=Regional Authority Index-Score (2010) by Hooghe et al. (2016) (0-27), Metro. Gov.=Metropolitan 
Government, Cent.=Residents in centre city, Surr.=Residents in surrounding area, Tot.=Total. 
A first reminder was sent two weeks after the initial letter, a second reminder was sent 
after one month to those individuals who had not replied by then. The second reminder 
included a paper version of the questionnaire and a prepaid return envelope. Individual 
identifiers were used for each potential respondent in order to exclude multiple responses to 
the survey. All in all, 1162 respondents filled in the questionnaire, either online (n=936) or on 
paper (n=226). The response rate (calculated on the valid addresses) is 52 percent. The field 
phase of the survey in Switzerland lasted from mid-September 2015 to early January 2016. 
In the remaining three countries, respondents were recruited from online-access panels and 
a quota-sampling strategy was applied to mirror the distribution of core features of the basic 
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population (i.e. residence in the core city or the suburbs, sex, age, employment status and 
education level). In these three countries, the survey was fielded by the international Survey 
Institute TNS Infratest. The field phase lasted from beginning of October to end of November. 
In this period between 606 and 667 complete interviews were conducted in each metropolitan 
area (see table 3). Respondents were incentivized through coupons by the panel providers.12 
Estimation Strategy and Robustness Checks 
For our analysis we rely on the –cjoint– package in R developed by Hainmueller et al. 
(2014). As mentioned before in the research design section, each respondent was presented 
with three choice tasks and accordingly evaluated six commissions. This means that choices 
are nested within respondents and that implies a transformation of the dataset: For each 
respondent we do not have one but six rows in the dataset. The unit of analysis is, thus, one 
commission. To account for the nested-ness of the commissions within respondents, we use 
clustered standard errors as it is suggested by Hainmueller et al. (2014). The independent 
variables – i.e. the five attributes – are introduced to the regression equation as dummy 
variables. This means that one of the attribute levels serves as the baseline in the models. The 
estimates one obtains through the use of the –cjoint– package are average marginal 
component effects (Hainmueller et al. 2014). This estimate can be interpreted as the effect of 
an individual treatment component – the whole commission or attribute combination being the 
treatment. More precisely, “the average marginal component effect (AMCE) represents the 
marginal effect of attribute l averaged over the joint distribution of the remaining attributes” 
(Hainmueller et al. 2014, 10). For the first dependent variable – the forced choice of one of 
the two commissions (see research design section) – this quantity can be interpreted as the 
percentage point change in the probability of choosing a commission when a certain attribute 
changes from the baseline level to the level of interest. For the second dependent variable – 
the rating of a commission – this quantity represents the change on the 1-7 scale when an 
attribute changes from the baseline level to the level of interest. In what follows, we will 
interpret the effects of the first dependent variable. The substantive results for the rating 
variable do not differ from the results for the forced choice variable (see figure A.3 in the 
appendix). 
For the analysis, we deleted rows with missing values for the dependent variables listwise 
(see figure A.2 in the appendix). The number of missing values is very low compared to the 
overall number of rows (102 rows out of 30312) and should, thus, not represent a problem. In 
                                                            
12 Due to the quota sampling procedure used in Germany, France and the UK, response rates for these countries 
are not available, as the sample composition (i.e. the contacted people) changes in the course of the field phase to 
meet the quotas. 
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addition, we checked whether the results without inconsistent respondent evaluations (i.e. 
choice of commission B and higher rating for commission A) differ from the overall results 
(see figure A.3). This is not the case and we, thus, used all complete respondent evaluations 
for our analysis. Finally, we also checked whether respondent characteristics influence the 
results. First, we separate people who use public transport from people who do not use public 
transport to get to work. One might expect that public transport users demand different things 
from such a commission than people who do not use public transport.13 This is not the case, 
however. A second test concerns the differences between respondents with low and with high 
trust in local institutions. Here, we find some small differences in the effect sizes but not in 
the relative strength of the attributes when they are compared to each other (see figure A.4 
and A.5 in the appendix). Finally, we analyzed whether the results differ across countries and 
regions (figure A.12 and A.13). The general picture does not differ markedly across countries, 
except for Switzerland. Here, we find that citizens deem ex-post approval by local 
governments more important and care less about the composition of the commission than 
citizens in the other three countries. This difference reflects the direct democratic referendum-
logic of the Swiss political system where representation can be substituted to a certain extent 
by popular veto possibilities. We do not find substantive additional variation when we 
compare metropolitan areas within a country. 
   
                                                            
13 E.g. the public transport non-users might be much more concerned with the budget question than with the 
question of the composition or the transparency of the commission. 
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Results  
In this section we present the main results of our conjoint experiment and test the three 
hypotheses: i.) that the output-dimension is more important than the input- and the 
throughput-dimension for the evaluation of specific governance arrangements, ii.) that 
citizens’ views of democracy guide their evaluation of specific governance arrangements and 
iii.) that irrespective of their views of democracy, citizens deem output the most important 
dimension in their evaluation of specific governance arrangements. 
Hypothesis 1: Output > Throughput and Input 
Figure 2 presents the results for the basic analysis of our conjoint experiment, which 
allows us to test hypothesis 1. 
Figure 2: Basic Analysis 
Note. N (Obs.)=30210, N (Resp.)=5041 
Generally, the results confirm what one would expect theoretically. Citizens prefer more 
democratic input (elected > delegated commission members), they prefer more democratic 
throughput (public > non-public negotiations) and they prefer better output (0-10% > 20-30% 
budget over-run). Furthermore, the preference for a commission increases when the decisions 
of this commission need to be approved by the local authorities in the metropolitan area. 
Surprisingly, citizens prefer commissions taking majoritarian decisions rather than unanimous 
ones and commissions composed of delegates are even less preferred than commissions 
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composed of experts. Finally, commissions that were shown on the left side of the screen are 
preferred over commissions shown on the right side. We, thus, need to control for these 
“profile-order-effects” (Hainmueller et al. 2014, 9) in subsequent analyses as well. 
Our first hypothesis stated that the output-dimension would – ceteris paribus – play a more 
important role in citizens’ evaluations of specific governance arrangements than the input- or 
the throughput-dimension. The results from figure 2 corroborate this assumption. A 
commission with only 0-10% budget over-run is more than 17% more likely to be chosen by 
respondents than a commission with 20-30% budget over-run. Interestingly, the throughput-
dimension seems to be the second most important one to determine respondents’ choice of a 
commission, whereas the mode of designation for the decision-makers within a commission 
(election, delegation or appointment) is considered to be the least important attribute, even 
less so than the two formal authority dimensions. 
In the research design section, we mentioned the possibility for interaction effects between 
attributes. For example, more democratic input might be deemed more important, when a 
commission has more formal authority. We tested whether such “average component 
interaction effects” (Hainmueller et al. 2014, 12) exist between our attributes. To do so, we 
analyzed subsets of the data for which one attribute was held constant at one level. We do not 
find any interaction effects between different attributes.14  
Hypotheses 2 and 3: Guidance by Democratic Norms and the Prevalence 
of Output 
So far, we have found support for hypothesis 1, that output is considered more important 
than throughput or input for the evaluation of specific governance arrangements. We now turn 
to the analysis for hypotheses 2 and 3, namely that citizens’ views of democracy guide their 
evaluation of specific governance arrangements but that output-considerations nevertheless 
outweigh the impact of democratic norm orientations. 
To do so, we compare groups of respondents across five democratic norms or trade-offs: i.) 
the representativeness vs. the efficiency of the decision-making process; ii.) respecting the 
will of the majority vs. protecting the rights of minorities; iii.) keeping decision-making 
processes transparent vs. enabling compromises; iv.) choosing better alternatives to the 
majority position vs. implementing the majority position and v.) complex decisions made by 
elected representatives vs. made by competent experts. For each of these trade-offs, we build 
three groups; one for each side of the trade-off and a third group of neutral respondents, which 
                                                            
14 The results for these estimations can be found in the appendix (figure A.7-figure A.11). 
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means that they did not state a preference for either position and rated them equally high or 
low. 
The results for these analyses are displayed in figures 3-7. 
Figure 3: Democratic Trade-Off: Representation vs. Efficiency 
 
Note. N (Obs.)=6090, N (Resp.)=1015 Note. N (Obs.)=7552, N (Resp.)=1260. Note. N (Obs.)=11542, N (Resp.)=1952.
Figure 4: Democratic Trade-Off: Majority Will vs. Minority Rights 
 
Note. N (Obs.)=10886, N (Resp.)=1817 Note. N (Obs.)=7146, N (Resp.)=1191. Note. N (Obs.)=7152, N (Resp.)=1192.
Overall, the results from these five tables suggest that citizens’ views and preferences for 
different aspects of democracy do indeed drive their evaluations of specific governance 
arrangements. Consider, for example, the trade-off between representation and efficiency: 
From figure 3 it becomes evident, that those who value representation more than efficiency 
deem approval by local governments (15% increase compared to 7.5% increase) and 
transparency of negotiations (18% increase compared to 7.5% increase) more important than 
those preferring efficiency over representation. Furthermore, the order of the attributes 
“elected representatives” and “independent experts” is reversed for the ones preferring 
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efficiency, although the difference between the two attributes is not significant for either 
group.  
This difference is significant, however, when we look at figure 4 and compare those who 
deem minority rights more important with those that deem majority will more important. 
Furthermore, those who prefer minority rights over majority deem local government approval 
of the commission’s decisions more important, which might reflect a preference for “checks 
and balances” captured in the preference for ensuring minority rights.  
Figure 5: Democratic Trade-Off: Transparency vs. Compromise 
 
Note. N (Obs.)=4644, N (Resp.)=774  Note. N (Obs.)=6586, N (Resp.)=1098. Note. N (Obs.)=13954, N (Resp.)=2328.
Figure 6: Democratic Trade-Off: Better Alternatives vs. Majority Will 
 
Note. N (Obs.)=7042, N (Resp.)=1174 Note. N (Obs.)=7150, N (Resp.)=1192. Note. N (Obs.)=10992, N (Resp.)=1834.
Looking at figure 5, we find the straightforward result that those preferring transparency 
over compromise deem the transparency of commissions more important for their choice than 
those preferring compromise over transparency. 
21 
 
Looking at figure 6 and 7, we find that those preferring better alternatives over majority 
decision-making and those preferring experts making complex decisions are more favorable 
of commissions composed of independent experts than the groups holding the respectively 
opposing views. The difference is especially striking in figure 7, where the effect of experts 
turns negative for those who prefer representatives solving complex issues. 
These results, thus, yield support for our second hypothesis that citizens’ views of 
democracy guide their evaluations of specific governance arrangements, although the impact 
of the views on citizens’ evaluations is not always straightforward (see for example figure 3). 
So far, we only looked at which attribute effects change when citizens value different 
democratic norms. However, we can also look at what does not change across citizen groups 
with respect to their evaluation of commissions. When doing so across figures 3-7, one thing 
is striking: The strongest effect on the probability of choosing a commission is always linked 
to the output-dimension. More precisely, the difference between the attribute level “0-10%”- 
and the baseline category “20-30%”-budget over-run is the most striking one across all 
groups. This means that there is no variation across different democratic norm orientations 
when it comes to the importance of output-legitimacy. It is always deemed the most important 
dimension. This lends support to our hypothesis 3. 
Figure 7: Democratic Trade-Off: Representatives vs. Experts 
 
Note. N (Obs.)=10726, N (Resp.)=1789 Note. N (Obs.)=6688, N (Resp.)=1115. Note. N (Obs.)=7770, N (Resp.)=1296.
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Conclusion 
How do citizens’ evaluate specific governance arrangements? Our results suggest that 
citizens’ generally value commissions that would be considered democratic from a 
“traditional” representative understanding: They demand input-, throughput-, and output-
legitimacy and they favor governance arrangements whose formal authority is restricted by 
external actors. Furthermore, we do also find evidence that citizens’ views of democracy drive 
their evaluation of governance arrangements – even in a context that is rather remote from 
what we normally think about when we refer to political institutions. Finally, however, we 
find that output-legitimacy is always the most important feature of a commission – 
irrespective of citizens’ views of democracy. This is in line with Fritz Scharpf’s (1999) 
famous claim that the problem-solving capacity is the most important tool for political actors 
to create democratic legitimacy perceptions among their constituents. 
The consistency between citizens’ views of democracy and their evaluation of the 
commissions suggests that we tapped into stable value orientations that can be mobilized for 
specific situations. This is an important finding, since such value orientations are often latent 
rather than explicit. Furthermore, the rather similar results across countries and metropolitan 
areas suggest that our findings can be generalized to other urban and metropolitan areas in 
Western Europe. At the same time, we have to be somewhat careful with generalizing the 
findings towards other governance arrangements in different contexts: The scenario of the 
experiment – construction of a new underground train line in respondents’ metropolitan area 
of residence – is obviously geared towards solving a public problem, namely the lack of 
public transport capacity. In this sense, it is not astonishing that the output dimension drives 
respondents’ evaluations to such a large extent. However, not all policies are exclusively 
about problem-solving. In particular, it is likely that the pattern would look different if the 
scenario did not only involve responses to a public problem, but also redistributive decisions 
that produce winners and losers. Our findings could, thus, be limited to pareto-efficient 
policies that do not involve redistributive issues. 
Future research should therefore scrutinize our results for different policy areas and policy 
types in different contexts. Particularly promising would be experiments concerning welfare 
state reform. While some scholars engaged in conjoint experiments in this domain (Gallego 
and Marx 2016, Häusermann et al. 2016), they are concerned with the design of a policy and 
not with the evaluation of the institution that is responsible for developing the policy. In 
addition to the scope conditions of our findings, the key link between views of democracy and 
evaluations of governance arrangements has to be explored further. Further research is needed 
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to better understand the determinants of citizens’ views of democracy but first and foremost 
we need to better understand how these views translate into evaluations. For which kind of 
citizens are these links particularly strong or weak? What intervening factors come into play 
here? For example, are voters of populist parties less driven by their view of democracy when 
evaluating governance arrangements, because they demand high input on an abstract level but 
especially want effective and efficient output when it comes to day-to-day politics? 
Finally, our results also have implications for politics. They suggest that from a citizens’ 
perspective the most important quality of political institutions is the capacity of “getting 
things done” and that procedural traits of liberal democracy are only of secondary importance. 
However, these procedural traits are not unimportant. To obtain political support, it is not 
enough to have a technocratic government that provides efficient and effective output and 
ignores the procedural side of democratic politics (cf. Caramani forthcoming) – not even in 
the case of a pareto-efficient public policy problem like underground line construction in 
metropolitan areas. While procedures are not the prime concern, they remain important 
features of legitimate governance arrangements and we should further disentangle the 
manifold ways in which substance and procedure generate political support.   
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Appendix 
Table A.1: Democratic Trade-Offs 
Often democracy is a compromise. Please tell us what you think about the following statements. 
To what extent do you agree or disagree? Again, there is no right or wrong answer, so please 
just indicate what you think. 
0= strongly disagree, 10=strongly agree, 88=don’t know 
[for each pair a separate page in the online survey] 
 
[Representation vs. Efficiency] 
1) It is important for the people's elected 
representatives to have a say in running 
government, even though this may slow down the 
process of policy-making. 
2) The government’s policy-making process should be 
organised as efficiently as possible, even if this 
sometimes implies bypassing the parliament for 
some urgent decisions. 
[Majority Will vs. Minority Rights] 
1) Citizens should have the right to vote on any 
constitutional clause, even if this leads to the 
abolishment or limitation of constitutional safeguards, 
such as certain minority rights.  
2) The constitution should guarantee certain 
constitutional safeguards that cannot be abolished 
by a popular vote, such as certain minority rights. 
[Transparency vs. Compromise] 
1) Political decision-making processes should always 
be as transparent as possible, even if this makes it 
harder to reach a compromise.  
2) Sometimes it is more important that decision-makers 
are able to reach a compromise than to make the 
decision-making process transparent for everyone at 
anytime. 
[Better Alternatives vs. Majority 
Will] 
1) Policy-makers should be prepared to revise majority 
positions in the light of better alternatives, even if the 
latter are proposed by a minority.  
2) Policy-makers cannot always take into consideration 
all possible alternatives when taking a decision. The 
important point is that their decisions reflect the will 
of the majority. 
[Representatives vs. Experts] 
1) Even complex issues should always be decided by 
elected representatives of the people and not by 
unelected experts. 
2) Independent experts are often more qualified to 
decide complex issues than elected politicians. 
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Figure A.1: Histograms of Democratic Trade-Offs 
 
Figure A.2: Inconsistent Answers and Missing Values by Rows 
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Figure A.3: All Answers vs. Consistent Answers Only 
Note. N (Obs.)=30210, N (Resp.)=5041 Note. N (Obs.)=30210, N (Resp.)=5041 
Note. N (Obs.)=27384, N (Resp.)=5015  Note. N (Obs.)=27384, N (Resp.)=5015 
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Figure A.4: Public Transport Users vs. Non-Users 
Note. N (Obs.)=9302, N (Resp.)=1553  Note. N (Obs.)=13288, N (Resp.)=2219 
Note. N (Obs.)=10510, N (Resp.)=1754  Note. N (Obs.)=12080, N (Resp.)=2018 
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Figure A.6: Results for Local Political Trust 
Note. N (Obs.)=12324, N (Resp.)=2056  Note. N (Obs.)=13974, N (Resp.)=2333 
Figure A.7: Input-Legitimacy: Composition Types 
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Figure A.8: Throughput-Legitimacy: Transparency Types 
Figure A.9: Output-Legitimacy: Types of Budget Over-Run  
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Figure A.10: Formal Authority: Types of Decision-Modes 
Figure A.11: Formal Authority: Implementation Types 
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Figure A.12: Cross-National Variation 
Note. N (Obs.)=6894, N (Resp.)=1156  Note. N (Obs.)=7548, N (Resp.)=1257 
Note. N (Obs.)=7848, N (Resp.)=1308  Note. N (Obs.)=7920, N (Resp.)=1320 
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Figure A.13: Cross-Regional Variation  
   
    
